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CASE NOTE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—“Can’t Touch This”: The Failing Standard
of New Jersey v. T.L.O. in School Searches; Safford Unified School District
No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009)
Jeremy Shufflebarger*

Introduction
On October 8, 2003, Assistant Principal Kerry Wilson at Safford Middle
School in Safford, Arizona received information from a student named Jordan
Romero concerning students potentially possessing illegal prescription pills on
school grounds, with the intent to ingest those pills at lunchtime.1 Jordan handed
Wilson one of the pills, informing Wilson that he received it from another
classmate, Marissa Glines.2 Wilson subsequently escorted Glines to his office,
and in the presence of a female administrator, Helen Romero, directed Glines to
empty her pockets and open her wallet.3 Glines emptied several pills, similar to
the pill Jordan handed to Wilson, from her pockets, and when asked from whom
she received the pills, she implicated Savanna Redding.4 Wilson then directed
Romero to escort Glines to the nurse’s office, where Romero ordered Glines to
lift up her shirt and pull out the band of her bra, as well as remove her pants
and stretch out the elastic on her underwear—revealing no further contraband.5
Acting on the tip by Glines, as well as other information, Wilson subsequently
escorted Redding to his office.6 Wilson proceeded to question Redding about the
pills found on Glines; Redding denied any knowledge of the pills.7 In the presence
of Romero, Wilson instituted a search of Redding’s backpack, which revealed
nothing.8 Romero then escorted Redding to the nurse’s office, where Romero
ordered Redding to strip down to her bra and underwear, pull out her bra, and
stretch out the elastic on her underwear—also uncovering no contraband.9
* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming College of Law, 2011. I would like to thank
Diane Courselle and Lisa Rich for their assistance in this process. I would like to give a special thank
you to my wife, Brook Bretthauer, for all of her support through this process.
Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Redding II), 531 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th
Cir. 2008).
1

Id. Jordan Romero is not related to the school’s administrative assistant, Helen Romero.
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding (Redding), 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2640 (2009).
2

3

Redding II, 531 F.3d at 1076.

4

Id.

5

Id. at 1077.

6

Id. at 1074–77.

7

Id.

8

Id.

9

Id. at 1074.
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Redding’s mother filed suit against Safford Unified School District No. 1,
Wilson, Romero, and Nurse Schwallier (collectively, “Administrators”), alleging
the strip search violated her daughter’s Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.10 After Redding’s defeat in the district court,
which a Ninth Circuit panel upheld, the Ninth Circuit en banc reversed—holding
the strip search violated Redding’s Fourth Amendment rights and granting
qualified immunity for everyone except Wilson.11
After granting the Administrators’ petition for certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court, in an 8-to-1 decision, applied the New Jersey v. T.L.O.
reasonableness standard, holding the search of Redding unreasonable in scope
and, thus, a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.12 However, the Court held
the doctrine of qualified immunity protected the Administrators from liability.13
This case note criticizes the Redding Court for missing an ideal opportunity
to revisit and clarify the confusing reasonable suspicion standard (first articulated
in T.L.O.). Instead, the Court expanded and further confounded school search
law.14 Moreover, this note details the progression of Fourth Amendment standards
for searches beginning with the initial probable cause standard in criminal cases
to the T.L.O. reasonable suspicion test currently utilized in schools.15 Finally,
this case note argues for an adoption of the Gates probable cause standard in
school searches.16

Background
Probable Cause—Gates
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.17 In Illinois v. Gates the

Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Redding III), 504 F.3d 828, 831 (9th
Cir. 2007).
10

11

Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding (Redding), 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2638 (2009).

Id. at 2643; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–42 (1985) (holding the reasonableness
of a search depends on two inquiries: (1) whether it was justified at its inception; and (2) whether it
was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place).
12

13

Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643.

14

See infra notes 109–44 and accompanying text.

15

See infra notes 17–46 and accompanying text.

16

See infra notes 145–70 and accompanying text.

17

U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
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United States Supreme Court established the current approach to determining
the existence of probable cause.18 In Gates, the Bloomingdale, Illinois police
department commenced surveillance of Gates, and executed a search warrant,
based on an anonymous letter informing police of Gates’s alleged drug related
activities.19 Upon Gates’s challenge to the admissibility of the evidence found
in the subsequent search and seizure of Gates’s home and car, the Court found
the traditional Aguilar v. Texas and Spinelli v. United States two-prong inquiry
too limiting.20 The Court held the distinct two-prong analysis in Aguilar–Spinelli
represented important considerations in a totality of the circumstances test, which
traditionally has guided probable cause determinations.21 According to the Gates
Court, the “totality of the circumstances test” operates as a balancing of all the
various “indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant’s tip.”22

Reasonable Suspicion Standard—Terry
In the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio the Court established a major exception
to the probable cause standard in search cases.23 Terry involved a “stop and frisk”
of Terry and two other men by a police officer, based on his observations and
suspicions of the mannerisms of the men.24 The subsequent search led to the
seizure of two revolvers and bullets from Terry.25 Upon Terry’s challenge to the
admissibility of the pistols as evidence, the Court held law enforcement may
execute less intrusive searches and seizures based on a lesser quantum of evidence
than traditional probable cause—the Court labeled this new standard “reasonable
suspicion.”26 The Court defined the reasonable suspicion standard as a two-part

issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
18

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).

19

Id. at 225.

Id. at 233, 238 (referring to Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114–15 (1964), overruled by
Gates, 462 U.S. at 233; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415–16 (1969), overruled by Gates,
462 U.S. at 233) (holding the Aguilar test focuses on two “largely independent channels”: the
reliability of the tipster paired with her basis for the knowledge of the tip).
20

Id. at 233. The Court effectively incorporated the two-prong inquiry of Aguilar and Spinelli
into the new Gates totality of the circumstances analysis. Id.
21

Id. at 234; see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment § 3.1 (explaining the Court in Gates developed the totality of the circumstances test as
the applicable rule for probable cause in search and arrest cases).
22

23

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1968); see infra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 5–7 (stating the officer justified his suspicion for the stop and search of
the men based on his training and years of experience with the police force).
24

25

Id. at 7.

1 Joshua Dressler & Alan C. Michaels, Understanding Criminal Procedure 145
(LexisNexis & Matthew Bender eds., 4th ed. 2006) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 37).
26
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analysis: (1) whether the search was justified at its inception; and (2) whether the
scope of the search reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the inception
of the search.27 According to the Court, a two-part test of reasonable suspicion
prevents “intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing
more substantial than inarticulate hunches.”28

School Search Standard—T.L.O.
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court developed a separate rule for
determining the reasonableness of school searches in the seminal case New Jersey
v. T.L.O.29 In T.L.O., a high school teacher escorted two students, including
T.L.O., to Assistant Vice Principal Choplick’s office after discovering them
smoking in the school lavatory.30 Choplick questioned T.L.O., who denied the
accusations.31 Choplick demanded to see T.L.O.’s purse, and when she opened
it, Choplick noticed a pack of cigarettes.32 Choplick proceeded to remove the
pack of cigarettes from the purse, and then noticed rolling papers.33 Suspecting
marijuana possession, Choplick thoroughly searched T.L.O.’s purse, which
revealed marijuana, a pipe, plastic bags, a large amount of money, an index
card listing people who owed T.L.O. money, and two letters implicating her in
marijuana dealing.34 The Court originally granted certiorari to determine the
issue of a remedy for an unlawful school search in a juvenile court proceeding,
but had to focus first on the threshold issue of whether the Fourth Amendment
restricts the actions of school authorities.35
In T.L.O., the State of New Jersey argued the Fourth Amendment applied
only to law enforcement officers, and did not apply to public officials, even though
they are classified as state agents.36 The Court rejected the State’s contention,
holding the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures applies to school officials who institute a search; after all, the Court
did not want to risk “strangl[ing] the free mind at its source and teach youth to

27

Terry, 392 U.S. at 19–20.

28

Id. at 21.

29

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333–42 (1985).

30

Id. at 328.

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id.

35

Id. at 332.

36

Id. at 334 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977)).
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discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”37 The Court
recognized schools require flexibility to maintain order and discipline in light of
the rising trend of violent crimes and drug use in the school setting.38 Moreover,
the Court found searches permissible without a warrant or probable cause when
the government possesses a special need, beyond normal crime control.39 Instead
of implementing the probable cause standard, the T.L.O. majority adopted the
framework of the Terry “reasonable suspicion” balancing test, but extended it to
apply to searches in the school setting.40 The Court held that in order for a search
to be justified at its inception, there must be a reasonable basis to suspect the
search will reveal evidence of a violation of the law or school rules.41 Moreover,
a search of a student is permissible in scope when “the measures adopted are
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in
light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”42
The T.L.O. reasonable suspicion standard has been applied in numerous
Fourth Amendment search cases, but often with inconsistent results.43 The most

37
Id. at 333–35 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943))
(listing numerous cases establishing that the Fourth Amendment applied to civil authorities); see also
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978) (holding the Fourth Amendment applied to firemen
entering private premises); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312–13 (1978) (holding the
Fourth Amendment applied to Occupation Safety and Health Act inspectors); Camara v. Mun. Ct.,
387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (holding the Fourth Amendment applied to building inspectors).
38

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339.

Id. at 325. The T.L.O. school search exception represents just one of the varied special
needs exceptions. See, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454–55 (1990) (holding
the operation of sobriety checkpoints to prevent drunk driving without a warrant or individual
suspicion valid under the Fourth Amendment); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 678–79 (1989) (holding drug testing of government drug interdiction agents or of people
in positions that require them to carry firearms without a warrant or individual suspicion valid under
the Fourth Amendment); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 632–34 (1989)
(holding drug and alcohol testing of railroad employees, after an accident has occurred involving
that employee, without a warrant or reasonable suspicion valid under the Fourth Amendment);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566–67 (1976) (holding the operation of border
checkpoints to detect illegal aliens without a warrant or individual suspicion valid under the
Fourth Amendment).
39

40
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337–42. The Court in T.L.O. adopted the requirement that the search
be justified at inception and permissible in scope in relationship to the objectives of the search. Id.
at 341–42. The Court stated, “On one side of the balance are arrayed the individual’s legitimate
expectations of privacy and personal security; on the other, the government’s need for effective
methods to deal with breaches of public order.” Id. at 337.
41

Id. at 337.

42

Id. at 342.

Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding (Redding), 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009)
(finding relevant the divisive holdings of lower court judges in strip search cases); see, e.g., Cason
v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188, 190, 193 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding a pat down search, purse search, and
locker search of a student reasonable based on information that items had gone missing in a locker
room and the student was one of four students in the locker room at the time the items went
43
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notable example of the inconsistent T.L.O. decisions is a line of strip search
cases since 1985.44 The divisiveness of these decisions is best evidenced by Mark
Anthony B., a Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia decision, where the
majority firmly rejected strip searches unless exigent circumstances are present,
when compared with Williams, a United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit decision, where the court granted significant deference to school officials
to utilize strip searches.45 The divide in these lower court decisions leading up to
Redding represents a fundamental confusion regarding how to correctly apply the
T.L.O. standard, especially in a strip search context.46

missing); Commonwealth v. Damian D., 752 N.E.2d 679, 727, 729 (Mass. 2001) (finding a search
of a student’s person based on the student’s “truant behavior” unreasonable at its inception, and
further finding the assistant headmaster’s decision was based on a misunderstanding of T.L.O.);
In re Juvenile, 931 A.2d 1229, 1232, 1234 (N.H. 2007) (holding the search of a student’s locker
for a “large pot pipe” reasonable under T.L.O., but finding further guidance was needed regarding
factors for whether the search was justified at its inception); Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350,
356 (Pa. 1998) (finding T.L.O. provides limited guidance for a general search of an entire school);
see also David C. Blickenstaff, Strip Searches of Public School Students: Can New Jersey v. T.L.O. Solve
the Problem?, 99 Dick. L. Rev. 1, 43–44 (1994) (stating that since the T.L.O. decision, lower courts
continue to differ on the constitutionality of strip searches in schools).
44
See Phaneuf v. Fraikin, 448 F.3d 591, 592–93, 600 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding the inception
of the strip search of a high school student unreasonable based on a tip by a fellow student that
Phaneuf planned on hiding marijuana down her pants during a bag check on a field trip); Cornfield
v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1319, 1323 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding a strip
search of a high school student reasonable on the suspicion he was hiding contraband in his crotch,
because he was too well endowed); Ex rel. Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 882–83, 887 (6th
Cir. 1991) (holding a strip search of a high school student reasonable based on a small brown vial
of an over-the-counter inhalant Williams pulled out of her purse and a tip that a fellow student saw
Williams with a glass vial of a white powdery substance); Widener v. Frye, 809 F. Supp. 35, 36, 38
(S.D. Ohio 1992) (holding a strip search of a high school student reasonable based on a teacher’s
observations of the student); Cales v. Howell Pub. Schs., 635 F. Supp. 454, 455, 457 (E.D. Mich.
1985) (holding the inception of the strip search of a high school student unreasonable based on
the tip of a school security guard that he witnessed the student ducking behind automobiles in the
parking lot); Coronado v. State, 835 S.W.2d 636, 637–38, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (holding a
strip search of a student unreasonable in scope based on the student attempting to skip out of school
and a tip two weeks prior to the search that the student was involved in drug distribution); State
ex rel. Galford v. Mark Anthony B., 433 S.E.2d 41, 42–43, 49 (W. Va. 1993) (holding a strip search
of a 14-year-old middle school student unreasonable in scope based on the student’s duties as an
assistant janitor in conjunction with $100 that went missing from a teacher’s classroom).
45

Compare Ex rel. Williams, 936 F.2d at 887, with Mark Anthony B., 433 S.E.2d at 49.

Scott A. Gartner, Note, Strip Searches of Students: What Johnny Really Learned at School and
How Local School Boards Can Help Solve the Problem, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 921, 950 (1997); see also
5 LaFave, supra note 22, § 10.11 (levying a detailed criticism at the T.L.O. majority’s decision to
reject probable cause in favor of a lesser reasonable suspicion standard in schools); Blickenstaff, supra
note 43, at 43–44 (observing such an “indefinite” standard fails to adequately ensure the protection
of students’ rights, because it grants courts too much leeway in deciding search cases).
46
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Principal Case
A week prior to Redding’s strip search, Jordan Romero and his mother met
with Principal Beeman and Assistant Principal Wilson, where Jordan’s mother
explained that a few nights earlier Jordan acted violently toward her and then later
he became ill.47 Jordan explained he had ingested pills he received from fellow
classmates.48 He also reported certain students were bringing pills and weapons
to school.49 Moreover, Jordan informed Wilson that Redding hosted a party prior
to a school dance, where she supplied alcohol to fellow students.50 In addition,
teachers notified Wilson that Redding and Glines were part of a rowdy group
of students at the school dance where the teachers detected the smell of alcohol
around them.51 Following the conclusion of the dance, administrators found a
bottle of alcohol and cigarettes in the girls’ bathroom.52
With this background information, as well as the pill Jordan received from
Glines, Principal Wilson went to Glines’s classroom and asked her to gather
her things and accompany him to his office.53 Wilson noticed an open planner
on the desk next to Glines, in which he found small knives, a cigarette lighter,
and a cigarette.54 Wilson then asked Glines about the planner.55 She responded
she did not know the source of the contraband.56 Wilson returned to his office
with Glines and asked a female administrator, Helen Romero, to observe while
he directed Glines to empty her pockets and open her wallet.57 Glines emptied
several 400 mg Ibuprofen pills from her pockets, as well as a blue pill.58 When
Wilson asked Glines how she obtained the blue pill, she responded, “I guess it
slipped in when she gave me the IBU 400s.”59 When asked who “she” was, Glines

47
Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Redding II), 531 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc).
48

Id.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id. at 1075.

52

Id.

53

Id. at 1076.

54

Id.

Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Redding III), 504 F.3d 828, 830 (9th
Cir. 2007).
55

56

Redding II, 531 F.3d at 1076.

Id.; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text (explaining Jordan Romero and Helen
Romero are not related).
57

58

Redding II, 531 F.3d at 1076.

59

Id.
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implicated a fellow student, Savanna Redding.60 Principal Wilson then escorted
Redding from class to his office.61 Wilson questioned Redding about the planner
and she informed him it belonged to her, but she lent it to Glines a couple of
days earlier.62 She denied knowledge of the contraband.63 Wilson showed Redding
the pills, and stated she violated school rule J-3050, which prohibited bringing
any prescription or over-the-counter drug on the school campus without prior
permission.64 Redding denied any knowledge of the pills.65 With the information
supplied by Glines and Romero, as well as the other tips, Wilson instituted a
search of Redding’s backpack and outer garments, which revealed nothing.66
Romero subsequently escorted Redding to the nurse’s office, where she ordered
Redding to strip down to her bra and underwear, pull out her bra, and stretch out
the elastic on her underwear—also uncovering no contraband.67

Lower Courts
Redding’s mother filed a § 1983 action against the Administrators, alleging
the search violated her daughter’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches.68 The Administrators moved for summary judgment, asserting a twoprong defense: first, the search did not violate Redding’s constitutional rights
and, second, even if it did, the doctrine of qualified immunity protected the
Administrators from civil suit.69 The United States District Court of Arizona

60

Id.

61

Id. at 1074.

62

Id. at 1075.

63

Id.

Id. Safford Middle School in Safford, Arizona, adopted a policy prohibiting the “nonmedical
use, possession, or sale of drugs on school property or at school events.” Redding v. Safford Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Redding III), 504 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 2007). The policy defines the term
“drugs” as including, but not limited to: (1) “[a]ll dangerous controlled substances prohibited by
law,” (2) “[a]ll alcoholic beverages,” and (3) “[a]ny prescription or over-the-counter drug, except
those for which permission to use in school has been granted.” Id.
64

65

Redding II, 531 F.3d at 1075.

66

Id.

67

Id. at 1074.

Redding III, 504 F.3d at 831 (bringing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the petitioners);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (creating a method for individuals to redress violations of their
federally protected rights from conduct by state or local government officials, who are usually
protected from tort liability through qualified immunity).
68

Redding III, 504 F.3d at 831. Administrators’ qualified immunity defense stated the law
was not clearly established at the time of the search. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982) (stating qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages
unless the court finds an official’s conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a “reasonable person” would have known); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 316
(1975) (holding there exists a “good faith” exception for school officials to a § 1983 action).
69
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found for the Administrators, holding the search did not violate Redding’s
constitutional rights.70 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s ruling
in favor of the Administrators.71 The Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear the case en
banc and in a closely divided decision, reversed the panel.72 The Ninth Circuit en
banc held the strip search unreasonable under the T.L.O. standard and granted
qualified immunity for the Administrators, except Principal Wilson, finding the
others did not act as independent decisionmakers.73

Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the issue of
whether the search by school officials of Redding’s underclothes violated Redding’s
Fourth Amendment rights and, if so, whether Principal Wilson should be granted
qualified immunity.74 Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito.75 The majority
upheld the Ninth Circuit’s determination that the strip search resulted in a
violation of Redding’s Fourth Amendment rights, but reversed the decision to
deny qualified immunity to Wilson, and remanded back to the district court to
decide the pending Monell claim.76
The majority began by focusing on the first prong of the T.L.O. analysis:
whether Wilson possessed reasonable suspicion to justify the inception of the
backpack search.77 The majority found Wilson possessed enough information
to reasonably assume Redding carried pills on her person or in her backpack,

70

Redding II, 531 F.3d at 1077.

71

Id.

Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding (Redding), 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2638 (2009). The
Ninth Circuit en banc split 8-to-3 on the unconstitutionality of the strip search of Redding, but
split 6-to-5 on denying qualified immunity for Wilson. Redding II, 531 F.3d at 1081–87.
72

73

Redding II, 531 F.3d 1081–89.

74

Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2637–38.

75

Id. at 2633.

Id. at 2644; see Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978)
(holding a local government may be liable under a § 1983 action only if the injury inflicted by its
employees or agents occurred in the execution of a government’s official policies or customs); see also
supra note 68 and accompanying text (defining a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim). Monell claims lie outside
the scope of this note. For more information about the Monell claim, see 1 LaFave, supra note 22,
§ 1.10, and 13 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts § 1.3 (2009).
76

77
Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2641; see supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text (stating T.L.O.
consists of a two-fold inquiry: whether an official possessed reasonable suspicion to justify the
inception of a search, and whether the search was reasonable in scope in light of the sex and age of
the student).
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and thus, to justify the search of the backpack and Redding’s outer garments.78
However, the majority found the next step in the search, from the backpack
and outer garments to the strip search of Redding in Nurse Schwallier’s office,
as “categorically distinct, requiring distinct elements of justification on the
part of school authorities for going beyond a search of outer clothing and
belongings.”79 In evaluating this type of search, the majority found particularly
relevant the reasonable expectation of privacy, and the degree of intrusiveness of a
strip search.80
The majority’s opinion focused primarily on the second prong of the T.L.O.
standard—whether the strip search of Redding was reasonable in scope.81 Applying
T.L.O., the majority held the search must be reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that justified the inception of the search and may not be excessively
intrusive when considering the age and gender of the student, in light of the
character of the infraction.82 The T.L.O. majority ruled (in light of Redding’s
sex and age) the low prescription strength of the 400 mg Ibuprofen combined
with the quantity of the pills failed to present enough of a dangerous threat to
the students to justify escalating to such an intrusive search.83 In finding the
search unreasonable, the Court also found relevant the lack of any information
showing Redding actually possessed pills in her underclothing at the time of the

Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2641 n.3 (“There is no question here that justification for the school
officials’ search was required in accordance with the T.L.O. standard of reasonable suspicion.”).
The Court found a variety of factors relevant including: the teachers’ suspicion that Redding and
Glines possessed and consumed alcohol at the school dance, Jordan’s tip regarding the party with
alcohol that Redding hosted at her house, evidence that Redding and Marissa were friends, the
contraband in the planner, Jordan’s tip that Marissa supplied the pills to him, the tip that students
were intending to ingest the pills during lunchtime, and Glines’s subsequent tip that she received
the pills from Redding. Id. at 2641.
78

79
Id. at 2641 (finding subjective and reasonable societal expectations of personal privacy to
support categorizing the strip search as a different kind of search). The Court refused to specifically
define a strip search, and instead focused on the impact on the students from this type of search.
See id.

Id. at 2641–42 (citing Brief for National Association of Social Workers et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009) (No. 08-479), 2009 WL 870022; Irwin
A. Hyman & Donna C. Perone, The Other Side of School Violence: Educator Policies and Practices that
May Contribute to Student Misbehavior, 36 J. School Psychol. 7, 13 (1998) (finding a strip search
can lead to severe emotional damage); New York City Dep’t of Educ., Reg. No. A-432, p. 2 (Sept.
13, 2005) (“Under no circumstances shall a strip-search of a student be conducted.”)).
80

81

Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2642.

82

Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–42 (1985)).

Id. at 2642 n.4 (“An Advil tablet, caplet, or gel caplet, contains 200 mg of ibuprofen.”)
(citing Physicians’ Desk Reference for Nonprescription Drugs, Dietary Supplements, and
Herbs 674 (28th ed. 2006)); id. at 2642 (“Wilson had no reason to suspect that large amount of the
drugs were being passed around, or that individual students were receiving great numbers of pills.”).
The Redding majority never clarified how these considerations fit into the scope-prong inquiry of
the T.L.O. standard. See id. at 2642.
83
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search.84 Ultimately, the Court held, “[t]he meaning of such a [strip] search, and
the degradation its subject may reasonably feel, place a search that intrusive in a
category of its own demanding its own specific suspicions.”85
Finally, the majority reversed the Ninth Circuit’s holding and granted Wilson
qualified immunity, following its recent Pearson v. Callahan decision, because the
law was not clearly established at the time of Wilson’s conduct.86 The majority
found compelling the inconsistent holdings in the strip search cases throughout
the district and circuit courts, as well as the divisiveness of the Ninth Circuit’s
previous holdings in this case.87

Stevens’s Concurring & Dissenting Opinion
The two concurring opinions in Redding affirmed the majority’s holding
that Redding’s search violated her Fourth Amendment rights, but diverged from
the majority on the question of whether Wilson should be denied qualified
immunity.88 Justice Stevens found the Redding search violated the scope prong
of the T.L.O. reasonableness inquiry, categorizing the strip search as a classic
case where “clearly established law meets clearly outrageous conduct.”89 Justice
Stevens went on to eschew the majority’s finding that the divisive nature of the
Ninth Circuit’s decisions in this case was compelling enough to meet the Pearson
standard in granting Wilson qualified immunity.90

84
Id. at 2642 (“[T]here is no evidence in the record of any general practice among Safford
Middle School students of hiding that sort of thing in underwear.”).
85

Id. at 2643.

Id. (holding a school official is entitled to qualified immunity where established law cannot
demonstrate the search of the student violated the Fourth Amendment); see Pearson v. Callahan, 129
S. Ct. 808, 813 (2009) (holding a petitioner possesses qualified immunity as a shield from liability
if the law was not clearly established that the search was unconstitutional). The qualified immunity
discussion lies outside the scope of this note. For more information on qualified immunity, see
1 LaFave supra note 22, § 1.10, and Wesley Kobylak, Annotation, Immunity of Public Officials from
Personal Liability in Civil Rights Actions Brought by Public Employees under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, 63
A.L.R. Fed. 744 (1983 & Supp. 2010).
86

87
Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2644 (“[T]he cases viewing school strip searches differently from the
way we see them are numerous enough, with well-reasoned majority and dissenting opinions, to
counsel doubt that we were sufficiently clear in the prior statement of law.”).
88

Id. at 2644–46 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring & dissenting).

Id. at 2644 (Stevens, J., concurring & dissenting) (finding the strip search of Redding
resulted in a far more intrusive search with less justifications to support it, than the search of the
purse in T.L.O.).
89

90
Id. at 2645 (finding the law clearly established at the time of Redding’s search, and the
inconsistent lower court decisions insufficient to uphold qualified immunity for Wilson).
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Ginsburg’s Concurring & Dissenting Opinion
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion also concurred with the majority’s holding
that Redding’s search violated the scope prong of the T.L.O. test, but further
emphasized the extremely intrusive nature of a strip search of a thirteen-year-old
girl and the lack of sufficient evidence to deem the search reasonable.91 Justice
Ginsburg agreed with Stevens’s dissent in denying Wilson qualified immunity.92

Thomas’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice Thomas wrote an opinion dissenting in part and concurring in
part.93 He argued the strip search did not violate Redding’s constitutional rights,
but agreed with the majority in granting Wilson qualified immunity.94 Justice
Thomas, in examining the reasonableness of the search, focused on the systemic
problems of school officials in maintaining order and discipline, especially in light
of the rising trend of violence and drug use.95
Justice Thomas argued the reasonable suspicion standard allows school officials
to retain expansive discretion to promote a safe and proper educational experience
for students.96 He reiterated that a search satisfies the permissible-in-scope prong
of the T.L.O. inquiry as long as “it is objectively reasonable to believe that the area
searched could conceal the contraband.”97 According to Justice Thomas, Wilson’s
reasonable suspicion that Redding possessed and intended to distribute pills to
other students did not dissolve once the search of the backpack failed to reveal
contraband.98 Thomas instead contended that after Wilson discovered no pills in
her backpack or outer garments, Wilson reasonably concluded Redding secreted
pills under her clothing.99 Thomas supported the Administrators’ position that
students will routinely hide contraband under their clothing.100
Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring & dissenting) (finding no evidence existed in this case nor
were there sufficient prior experiences at the school that would lead a reasonable person to believe
Redding would secret pills under her clothes).
91

92
Id. at 2646 (finding the law clearly established at the time of Redding’s search, and
Wilson’s actions amounted to an abuse of authority, thus invalidating any justification to grant him
qualified immunity).
93

Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting & concurring).

94

Id.

Id. at 2646 (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975)); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (finding schools have a compelling need to maintain a safe environment
to promote learning).
95

96

Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2647 (Thomas, J., dissenting & concurring).

97

Id.

98

Id. at 2650.

Id. (arguing Wilson’s conclusion was “eminently reasonable,” especially considering that
students routinely hide contraband under their clothing).
99

100

Id.
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Justice Thomas also attacked the majority for defying traditional T.L.O.
reasoning by interpreting the “nature of the infraction” portion of the permissiblein-scope prong to allow judges to substitute their judgment for a particular school
policy or rule.101 He argued the school rule J-3050, prohibiting the possession
of prescription drugs on school property, not only parallels a similar Arizona
criminal statute, but also was implemented to combat a troubling trend of
teenage abuse of prescription and over-the-counter drugs.102 According to Justice
Thomas, this trend is particularly troubling for officials due to the myth among
students that these drugs provide a “safe high.”103 Furthermore, Justice Thomas
noted the likelihood of injuries or deaths that could result from students ingesting
potentially lethal combinations of these drugs.104
Justice Thomas concluded the majority, in effect, managed to replace a school
rule that does not distinguish between drugs, with a law that does.105 According to
Thomas, the majority’s holding created an “unworkable and unsound” test, where
the Court permits a search of a student for a prohibited drug only if the official
can demonstrate a sufficient showing of the dangerous potency of the drug.106
Thomas feared the majority’s approach in Redding risks yielding control of the
public school system to its students.107 Alternatively, Justice Thomas suggested
returning to the common law doctrine of in loco parentis, which would return the
parental authority back to the teachers to maintain a safe and educational learning
environment for students.108
101
Id. (“This approach directly conflicts with T.L.O. in which the Court was ‘unwilling to
adopt a standard under which the legality of a search is dependent upon a judge’s evaluation of
the relative importance of the school rules.’”) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342
n.9 (1985)).

Id. at 2653 (citing Ken Schroeder, Get Teens Off Drugs, Educ. Digest 75 (Dec. 2006));
see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3406(A)(1) (Supp. 2008) (“A person shall not knowingly . . .
[p]ossess or use a prescription-only drug unless the person obtains the prescription-only drug
pursuant to a valid prescription of a prescriber who is licensed pursuant to [state law.]”).
102

103
Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2653 (Thomas, J., dissenting & concurring) (citing Office of Nat’l
Drug Control Policy, Teens and Prescription Drugs: An Analysis of Recent Trends on the
Emerging Drug Threat 3 (2007) (noting youth ages 12 to 17 abuse prescription drugs more than
any other illegal narcotics combined)).

Id. at 2654 (citing Nat’l Ctr. on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia Univ.,
Under the Counter: the Diversion and Abuse of Controlled Prescription Drugs in the
U.S. 25 (2005)); see also Press Release, Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin., U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Emergency Room Visits Climb for Misuse of Prescription
and Over-the-Counter Drugs (Mar. 13, 2007), available at http://www.samhsa.gov/newsroom/
advisories/0703135521.aspx (“[Hospital] visits involving the nonmedical use of prescription or
over-the-counter drugs increased from 495,732 to 598,542. The majority of these visits involved
multiple drugs.”).
104

105

Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2651 (Thomas, J., dissenting & concurring).

106

Id.

107

Id. at 2655 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 421 (2007)).

Id. For more information on in loco parentis, see 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent and Child § 9
(2009), and 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 346 (2009).
108
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Analysis
Redding v. Safford Unified School District No. 1 represents yet another example
of a long line of Fourth Amendment cases where the majority developed new
requirements for a case specific situation—Redding’s strip search.109 For a search
to satisfy the permissible-in-scope prong, Redding now requires a court—in
addition to utilizing the traditional T.L.O. standard—to consider evidence of the
dangerous power and quantity of the contraband as well as evidence the suspect
actually secreted contraband under his or her clothes.110 Redding operates as an
extension of the T.L.O. rule, specific to severe invasions of privacy.111 Redding
and T.L.O. continue to fail in providing clear guidelines for practitioners and
school officials when dealing with Fourth Amendment searches in schools.112 The
clear alternative is the existing Fourth Amendment standard of probable cause,
supported by a long history of case law to guide school officials on how to conduct
constitutionally valid searches in schools.113

The Inadequacies of Redding and the Failing T.L.O. Standard
Redding and T.L.O. leave school officials, courts, and practitioners with an
unpredictable standard, which will apply inconsistently depending on the specific
facts of a case.114 First, the Redding Court never explained how to apply the
factors properly in the T.L.O. permissible-in-scope prong.115 This prong requires
109
Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643; see, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)
(establishing a two-prong reasonable suspicion test for searches in schools); New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (creating a separate rule specific to automobile searches incident to arrest);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 756 (1969) (establishing the current rule for the search incident
to arrest exception, which limited the area police officers could search to the limited area around the
defendant); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19–21 (1968) (establishing a reasonable suspicion standard
for lesser intrusive searches like a “stop and frisk” search); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
162 (1924) (establishing the automobile exception for the warrant requirement in vehicle searches).
110

Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643.

Id. (finding the extremely intrusive nature and implications of a strip search place it in a
distinct category requiring a much greater level of specific suspicions).
111

112
See Blickenstaff, supra note 43, at 54–55 (observing there is much confusion for what
precisely is reasonable in student strip search cases); see also infra notes 114–41 and accompanying
text (describing the case specific nature of the Redding holding and trouble lower courts have
encountered in applying the reasonableness standard to school searches).

See infra notes 147, 154 and accompanying text (listing the cases where the Court has
developed the probable cause standard).
113

See infra notes 114–41 and accompanying text; see also Martin R. Gardner, Student Privacy
in the Wake of T.L.O.: An Appeal for an Individualized Suspicion Requirement for Valid Searches
and Seizures in the Schools, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 897, 922 (1988) (voicing fears that T.L.O. opens the
floodgates for abandonment of decades of rule-focused jurisprudence for a case-by-case analysis
of reasonableness).
114

Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2641–43. The Court briefly mentioned the damaging effects of a
strip search on young people in general, but never provided any analysis of the relevance of Redding’s
specific age, her gender, or the nature of her alleged infraction. See id.
115
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the search to be reasonably related to the search’s objectives, without resulting in
an “excessively intrusive” search in light of the student’s age and sex, as well as
the nature of the infraction.116 A major criticism of the original T.L.O. decision
targeted the Court’s complete lack of guidance on the relevance of and weight
given each factor in the permissible-in-scope prong.117 Twenty-five years later, the
Redding decision offered an ideal case for the Court to finally provide guidance
on how to correctly apply these factors, bearing in mind Redding’s young
adolescent age, her gender, and the nature of her alleged unlawful possession
of low-strength prescription drugs.118 However, the Redding Court avoided the
discussion altogether, thus failing to provide any clear guidelines for how school
officials, courts, and practitioners may correctly analyze each factor of the T.L.O.
permissible-in-scope prong.119
Moreover, in Redding both the majority and dissent managed to apply only
parts of the T.L.O. permissible-in-scope prong.120 The Redding majority focused
solely on “excessive intrusiveness,” without explaining why the search failed to
relate to the objectives of the search.121 The Redding majority’s faulty analysis of
116

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).

See Gardner, supra note 114, at 922 (stating the T.L.O. majority never explained how or
why these factors are relevant); see also T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 365 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring
& dissenting) (“As compared with the relative ease with which teachers can apply the probable-cause
standard, the amorphous ‘reasonableness under all the circumstances’ standard freshly coined by
the Court today will likely spawn increased litigation and greater uncertainty among teachers and
administrators.”). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit provided a scathing
criticism of T.L.O.’s complete lack of guidance for the scope factors:
117

[N]o reasonable school official could glean from these broadly-worded phrases
whether the search of a younger or older student might be deemed more or less
intrusive; whether the search of a boy or girl is more or less reasonable, and at what
age or grade level; and what constitutes an infraction great enough to warrant a
constitutionally reasonable search or, conversely, minor enough such that a search of
property or person would be characterized as unreasonable. . . .
Indeed, not only does the language used by the Court to announce a legal
standard regarding the permissible scope of a reasonable school search lack specificity
but, it appears, purposefully so.
Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 825–827 (11th Cir. 1997).
118

Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2637, 2642.

See id. at 2641–43. The Court in Redding focused solely on the excessive intrusiveness of
the strip search in light of the lack of sufficient suspicions by Wilson. See id. (“[T]he content of
the suspicion failed to match the degree of intrusion . . . . [The] meaning of such a search, and the
degradation the subject may reasonably feel, place a search that intrusive in a category of its own
demanding its own specific suspicions.”); see also Jenkins, 115 F.3d at 828 (“[T.L.O.] did not attempt
to establish clearly the contours of a Fourth Amendment right as applied to the wide variety of
possible school settings different from those involved in [T.L.O.]”).
119

120

See infra notes 121–26 and accompanying text.

See Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2641–43. Instead, the majority took particular care to point out
the extremely intrusive nature of a strip search and the resulting psychological damage it causes to
children and adolescents. See id. at 2641–42 (describing a strip search as “embarrassing, frightening,
and humiliating”).
121
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the permissible-in-scope prong lacks support from case law.122 A series of Fourth
Amendment cases have held the reasonableness of a search’s scope depends “only
on whether it is limited to the area that is capable of concealing the object of
the search.”123 Accordingly, once the search of Redding’s backpack and outer
garments revealed no contraband—with the information Wilson possessed—he
reasonably assumed Redding hid the pills in a place she thought no one would
look: under her clothes.124 But even Justice Thomas in his lengthy dissent failed
to assess completely T.L.O.’s scope requirement.125 The discrepancy between
the opinions of Thomas and the majority represents a further example of the
numerous difficulties school officials, courts, and practitioners face in correctly
applying the T.L.O. standard to school searches.126
Next, the Redding majority included additional factual considerations
beyond those required under the T.L.O. permissible-in-scope prong.127 The
majority insisted on two “distinct elements” to justify such an intrusive search,
122

See infra note 123 and accompanying text.

Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2649 (Thomas, J., dissenting & concurring) (emphasis added)
(citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999) (holding law enforcement officers may
search the belongings of passengers in a vehicle without individualized probable cause that the
passenger’s belongings contain the suspected contraband); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251
(1991) (holding the scope of a search is defined by its expressed object, thus holding that a search of
a container in a car that could contain narcotics was reasonable); United States v. Johns, 469 U.S.
478, 487 (1985) (holding the subsequent search of packages in trucks was reasonable based on the
reasonable belief the trucks contained illegal contraband); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820
(1982) (holding a lawful search of a premises extends to the entire area the object could be found
in, including containers or packages)).
123

124

Id. at 2650.

Compare id. at 2646–59 (failing to mention the relevance of Redding’s age or sex in his
dissent), with New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985) (holding a search will be permissible
in its scope when it is not excessively intrusive considering the age and sex of the student and the
nature of the infraction).
125

126
See supra notes 121–25 and accompanying text. Commentators Avery and Simpson listed
examples of areas of search law left unanswered by T.L.O.:

1.

How does this standard relate to the general search versus the particularized
search?

2.

How does police involvement, prior or otherwise, alter the lawfulness of the
search?

3.

Under what circumstances, if any, is a strip search justified?

4.

Are articles placed in a student’s car or locker given less protection than articles
places on a student’s person or purse?

5.

In short, what are the consequences and legal safeguards associated with
particular types of searches?

Charles W. Avery & Robert J. Simpson, Search and Seizure: A Risk Assessment Model for Public School
Officials, 16 J.L. & Educ. 403, 407–08 (1987).
See infra note 128 and accompanying text. However, the Redding majority correctly applied
the first prong of the T.L.O. test, finding Wilson possessed sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify
the inception of the search. See Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2641.
127
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which have no place in school search jurisprudence: evidence of the dangerous
power or quantity of the pills and evidence the student secreted the pills
under her clothes.128 Accordingly, in future cases a strip search could be found
legitimate if, under a similar fact pattern, the prescription drug was a stronger
painkiller.129 The majority’s holding, contrary to providing guidance for school
officials on conducting strip searches, manages only to further entangle an already
perplexing standard.130
Also, the Redding majority’s misapplication of the T.L.O. standard will result
in a further lack of predictability for school officials, courts, and practitioners.131
This becomes especially significant when considering many educators already do
not understand the breadth of a student’s Fourth Amendment protection from
unreasonable searches.132 Redding illustrates the difficulty courts at all levels face
in attempting to apply the T.L.O. standard to school searches.133 In a line of strip
search cases since T.L.O., lower courts have managed to fall across the spectrum
in attempting to apply the standard properly.134 In many of these cases, the courts
128
See Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2641–43; id. at 2649 (Thomas, J., dissenting & concurring)
(contending the majority’s approach is “an unjustifiable departure from bedrock Fourth Amendment
law” in the school setting). The majority never required these additional considerations in the T.L.O.
two-prong test. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341, 347–48.

See John Dayton & Anne Proffitt Dupre, Searching for Guidance in Public School Search
and Seizure Law: From T.L.O. to Redding, 248 Educ. L. Rep. 19, 32 (2009) (“Even if the law
concerning strip searches was not well established prior to Redding, after Redding, strip searches for
non-dangerous contraband based on insufficient evidence will likely result in both institutional and
individual liability for school officials.”).
129

See supra notes 115–29 and accompanying text; see also Steven F. Shatz et al., The Strip
Search of Children and the Fourth Amendment, 26 U.S.F. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1992) (“[T.L.O.’s] departure
from established doctrine, its vague reasoning, and its lack of stated standards make its application
to child strip searches extremely problematic.”).
130

131
See Gartner, supra note 46, at 949, 951–52, 955 (observing case law subsequent to
T.L.O. demonstrates the standard failed to offer sufficient guidance to school officials and courts,
and even if the Supreme Court heard a strip search case without requiring a probable cause
standard, inconsistent adjudications would continue, and thus would fail to provide guidance for
school officials).

Id. at 955 (stating news accounts and research studies indicate a lack of knowledge on
the part of school officials regarding the legality of searches and seizures in schools—a direct result
from the lack of training and experience of school officials in Fourth Amendment search and
seizure matters).
132

133
Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643 (referring to a number of divisive lower court strip
search decisions).
134
E.g., Ex rel. Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 882–83, 887 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding a
strip search of a high school student reasonable based on a small brown vial of an over-the-counter
inhalant Williams pulled out of her purse and a tip that a fellow student saw Williams with a glass
vial of a white powdery substance); State ex rel. Galford v. Mark Anthony B., 433 S.E.2d 41, 42–43,
49 (W. Va. 1993) (holding a strip search of a 14-year-old middle school student unreasonable
in scope based on the student’s duties as an assistant janitor in conjunction with $100 that went
missing from a teacher’s classroom); see also supra note 44 and accompanying text (listing numerous
inconsistent lower court strip search decisions).
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failed to assess relevant factors in the balancing test, such as the student’s age,
history of drug use or violence in schools, or the student’s disciplinary record.135
Even the T.L.O. majority managed to overlook the age and sex of the student, as
well as the nature of the intrusion facet of the permissible-in-scope prong of the
standard it created.136
Furthermore, the T.L.O. reasonableness standard has left courts and
practitioners with little direction in handling various other Fourth Amendment
search issues in schools.137 These unanswered issues include: whether the
exclusionary rule is applicable; what standard of suspicion is sufficient when
the search involves school officials and law enforcement working together;
and whether students’ privacy rights extend to unique school property, such
as lockers.138 The Redding majority expressed concern with the decades of
inconsistent applications of the T.L.O. standard.139 Nevertheless, the Court chose

Tamela J. White, Note, Williams by Williams v. Ellington: Strip Searches in Public
Schools—Too Many Unanswered Questions, 19 N. Ky. L. Rev. 513, 539–40 (1992) (“Although these
were not requirements of the [T.L.O.] decision, these are attributes that weigh heavily in the balance
of the competing interests at hand.”); see, e.g., Ex rel. Williams, 936 F.2d at 882–83, 887 (holding
the strip search of a high school girl unreasonable, failing to mention the student’s actual age at all
in the opinion, and failing to analyze the sex of the student as well as the nature of her infraction);
Widener v. Frye, 809 F. Supp. 35, 36, 38 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (holding a strip search of a high school
student reasonable, failing to mention the boy’s age, any history of him breaking previous rules,
and never mentioning any infraction of school rules or the law by the boy); Mark Anthony B., 433
S.E.2d at 42–43, 49 (holding a strip search of a fourteen year-old-boy unreasonable in scope, failing
to mention any other relevant factors beyond the nature of the infraction).
135

136
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985) (holding a search is permissible in scope
when it is not excessively intrusive considering the sex and age of the student as well as the nature of
the infraction); see also Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 825 (11th Cir. 1997)
(“Specific application of the factors established to define the constitutionally permissible parameters
of a school search . . . is notably absent from the Court’s discussion and conclusion with respect
to [T.L.O.]”).
137
See Jason E. Yearout, Note, Individualized School Searches and the Fourth Amendment:
What’s a School District to Do?, 10 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J., 489, 495–96 (2002) (listing the
various areas of Fourth Amendment search law for which T.L.O. has failed to provide guidance); see
also Avery & Simpson, supra note 126, at 407–08 (listing examples of unanswered questions that
the T.L.O. standard imparts).
138

Yearout, supra note 137, at 495–96.

Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding (Redding), 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2643–44 (2009);
see, e.g., Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 956–57 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding a group strip search
over a missing $26 unreasonable but granting qualified immunity because the law was too unclear to
put the school official on notice that his conduct violated the students’ constitutional rights); Jenkins,
115 F.3d at 828 (“[T.L.O. represents a] series of abstraction on the one hand, and a declaration of
seeming deference to the judgments of school officials, on the other.”); Ex rel. Williams, 936 F.2d
at 882–83, 887 (holding a strip search of a high school student for a drug reasonable, without any
suspicion the contraband was hidden next to her person); see also supra note 44 and accompanying
text (listing numerous divisive holdings of strip search cases amongst the lower courts since the
T.L.O. decision).
139
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not to reevaluate T.L.O.—instead it effectively proclaimed the fault in Redding
existed in the actions of Wilson, not in the T.L.O. standard.140 As a result, the
Redding decision offers limited guidance to courts and school officials only when
handling factually parallel cases, thus forcing courts and officials in future school
search cases to rely on the already problematic T.L.O. standard.141
In sum, Redding illustrates that even the United States Supreme Court
resorts to the creation of ad hoc, additional considerations when applying T.L.O.
to certain fact-specific situations.142 The Supreme Court specifically designed
the T.L.O. standard to provide school officials with a common sense method
to regulate conduct while upholding students’ privacy interests.143 However, the
T.L.O. standard remains too inconsistent, broad, and vague for school officials to
effectively utilize it in the school setting.144

Instituting a Probable Cause Standard in Schools
The post-T.L.O. school strip search cases, culminating in Redding, conclusively
demonstrate the need for a workable standard in the school setting: probable
cause.145 The Court in Terry v. Ohio created the reasonable suspicion standard

Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643–44. Justice Ginsburg’s concurring and dissenting opinion
most clearly illustrates this point by labeling Wilson’s “humiliating stripdown search” of Redding as
an “abuse of authority of [an] order [that] should not be shielded by official immunity.” Id. at 2645
(Ginsburg, J., concurring & dissenting).
140

141
See id. at 2642–43 (majority opinion) (giving no indication that if the contraband was a
narcotic or dangerous weapon of some sort the Court would require the same considerations as in
Redding); see also Dayton & Dupre, supra note 129, at 30–31 (“The Court’s opinion in Redding
makes it clear that when the search is premised on finding a non-dangerous item, school officials’
legitimate interest in finding and seizing the non-dangerous item is unlikely to warrant an intrusive
search . . . . [T.L.O.] remains the standard for searches of students by public school officials.”);
Gerald S. Reamey, New Jersey v. T.L.O.: The Supreme Court’s Lesson on School Searches, 16 St.
Mary’s L.J. 933, 948–49 (1985) (“[T.L.O.’s reasonableness test] requires great care to avoid abuse,
and whatever its virtue, it is likely to foster inconsistency of application and result.”).
142
See supra note 128 and accompanying text (describing the two additional requirements
the majority used to decide Redding); see also Dayton & Dupre, supra note 129, at 32 (“[T]he most
intrusive searches, if ever reasonable, would require credible evidence of urgency, danger, and a
reasonable basis for believing that the danger is hidden in an intimate area.”).
143

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985).

Blickenstaff, supra note 43, at 54–55; Gartner, supra note 46, at 949–50; see also Sunil
H. Mansukhani, School Searches After New Jersey v. T.L.O.: Are There Limits?, 34 J. Fam. L. 345,
360 (1995) (claiming the T.L.O. reasonableness standard fails to provide courts with a clear test to
apply to various fact specific situations); Reamey, supra note 141, at 948 (“[R]eduction of the level
of suspicion justifying a search will inevitably increase the incidence of mistake, particularly in the
absence of review by a magistrate.”).
144

145
See Blickenstaff, supra note 43, at 41 (stating under T.L.O. substantial inconsistencies and
difficulties exists in how to correctly apply T.L.O., as evidenced by the divisive strip search cases in
the lower courts); see also Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding (Redding), 129 S. Ct. 2633,
2638 (2009) (evidencing the split in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in the Redding case, and the closely
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(which T.L.O. adopted) to fit the specific mold of a stop and frisk search, never
intending it to apply in a full-scale search.146 Justice Brennan in his prescient
dissent in T.L.O. aptly criticized the majority’s test as a “sizable innovation in
Fourth Amendment analysis” that “finds support neither in precedent nor policy
and portends a dangerous weakening of the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to
protect the privacy and security of our citizens.”147 Reasonable suspicion would be
legitimate for a minimally intrusive Terry “stop and frisk” search, but because the
T.L.O. majority conceded students possess legitimate expectations of privacy and
Fourth Amendment rights, probable cause should be the only applicable standard
for a full search.148
The T.L.O. majority voiced two primary justifications for adopting a
reasonable suspicion standard in schools: (1) the T.L.O. standard would spare
educators the “necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable
divided Ninth Circuit en banc decision); Neal I. Aizenstein, Fourth Amendment—Searches by Public
School Officials Valid on “Reasonable Grounds”: New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985), 76 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 898, 923–24 (1985) (observing the reasonable suspicion standard lacks
authority and promotes inconsistency in case law); supra note 44 and accompanying text (listing the
split in circuit court decisions regarding strip searches).
146
See Gardner, supra note 114, at 920 (“Several critics have taken the [T.L.O.] Court to task
for its misuse of prior precedent in attempting to justify the rejection of the probable cause standard
in school searches in favor of the reasonable grounds, balancing approach.”); Mansukhani, supra
note 144, at 351 (explaining the Terry Court’s rationale in adopting a lesser standard of suspicion
was to ensure officer and the public’s safety, by allowing an officer to engage in a quick pat down
search of a person suspected of hiding a weapon—not a full-scale search); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 27 (1968). The Terry majority held:

[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search
for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to
believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of
whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
147
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 358 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring & dissenting). Justice
Brennan cited a long line of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence which holds probable cause is
a prerequisite for any full-scale search. Id. at 358–59; see United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891,
896 (1975) (“A search, even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion of privacy. To protect that
privacy from official arbitrariness, the Court always has regarded probable cause as the minimum
requirement for a lawful search.” (citation omitted)); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970)
(“In enforcing the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures,
the Court has insisted upon probable cause as a minimum requirement for a reasonable search
permitted by the Constitution.”); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (“[O]n reason
and authority the true rule is that if the search and seizure . . . are made upon probable causes . . .
the search and seizure are valid.”).

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 362 (Brennan, J., dissenting & concurring); see also Aizenstein, supra
note 145, at 930 (stating only a probable cause standard sufficiently protects students’ privacy
interests in schools); Mansukhani, supra note 144, at 351–61 (observing a Terry stop and frisk
search fails to amount to a full-scale search, and would be appropriate in situations where an officer
has reason to believe a person possesses an object that could harm the person conducting the search
or bystanders).
148
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cause,” and (2) a probable cause standard would allow students engaged in
criminal activity, like T.L.O., to escape punishment.149 However, neither of
these justifications holds up to scrutiny. First, the Court decided Illinois v. Gates
specifically to create a “common sense” and “practical” probable cause standard,
hinging on an evaluation of the “totality of the circumstances,” that would apply
neatly in numerous areas, such as schools.150 Ironically, in its search for such a
common sense standard the T.L.O. majority created a far more confusing and
muddled standard than the already existing post-Gates probable cause standard.151
Second, in T.L.O. and many of the search cases applying T.L.O., there existed
sufficiently detailed and specific evidence of criminal activity to meet the probable
cause “totality of the circumstances” test.152 Moreover, school officials often work
in a position to gather far more reliable and verifiable information than police
officers, due to the amount of time the officials spend with a limited amount
of students and the reliability of student and teacher informants.153 The clear
solution for the increasingly inconsistent and unworkable T.L.O. standard is a
reversion to probable cause.154

149
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340–43 (finding the search would fail to meet the onerous requirements
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for probable cause).

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238–39 (1983) (“We are convinced that this flexible, easily
applied standard will better achieve the accommodation of public and private interests that the
Fourth Amendment requires.”); see Aizenstein, supra note 145, at 927–30 (observing the probable
cause standard has developed over years of case law to become a common sense test hinging on
an assessment of the totality of circumstances, which is particularly well suited to the school
environment); see also 5 LaFave, supra note 22, § 10.11 (asserting the Court in T.L.O. could not
demonstrate how the probable cause standard would fail in the school context, and until it can be
proven the probable cause standard (with decades of jurisprudence supporting it) is unworkable,
then probable cause should be the only standard in schools); Mansukhani, supra note 144, at
351–61 (listing numerous often cited justifications for lesser standards than probable cause cited
in case law and demonstrating how they do not apply in the school setting, thus proving probable
cause is perfectly applicable in the school setting).
150

See Aizenstein, supra note 145, at 923 (“Unlike the probable cause standard, which has
many court decisions and legal authorities defining its meaning, there is little authority available
defining a [reasonable suspicion standard].”); see also Avery & Simpson, supra note 126, at 407–08
(listing the numerous areas of potential conflict in search cases where T.L.O. has failed to provide a
clear standard for school officials and courts to follow); Blickenstaff, supra note 43, at 43 (describing
the T.L.O. standard as indefinite and too mushy).
151

See 5 LaFave, supra note 22, § 10.11 (noting that most school search cases satisfy the
traditional probable cause requirement) (citing In re Doe, 91 P.3d 485 (Haw. 2004); In re L.A.,
21 P.3d 952 (Kan. 2001); Commonwealth v. Lawrence L., 792 N.E.2d 109 (Mass. 2003)); see
also Mansukhani, supra note 144, at 360 (“[T]he Court took the ‘easy’ case [in] announcing a
[reasonableness] standard that would govern subsequent school searches. . . . [T]here was no need
for the Court to depart from the traditional probable cause standard to reach the same result
in T.L.O.”).
152

153

Reamey, supra note 141, at 947–48.

See 2 LaFave, supra note 22, § 3.2 (referring to a long history of case law development for
the probable cause standard); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 360 (1985) (Brennan,
J., concurring & dissenting) (finding that probable cause determines the legitimacy of any searches
154
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Applying the probable cause standard in the school setting becomes especially
appropriate in light of the ever-increasing similarities between law enforcement
officers and school officials.155 In numerous search cases reaching the appellate
courts, the official involved worked as a school administrator, not a teacher.156 The
role of school administrators seems analogous to the duties of law enforcement
officers: school officials operate as agents of the state, enforce rules and regulations,
mandate compulsory attendance of students, and much of what they uncover
in searches of students may lead to criminal prosecution or school disciplinary
measures.157 In search cases involving both administrators and police officers,
many courts allowed the use of the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, only
resorting to a probable cause standard in very narrow circumstances.158 Requiring

beyond a minimal Terry-type stop and frisk search); Gerald S. Reamey, When “Special Needs” Meet
Probable Cause: Denying the Devil Benefit of Law, 19 Hastings Const. L.Q. 295, 329 (1992)
(“It may seem peculiar to argue that probable cause is more predictable than some other form of
analysis. Considerable precedent exists, however, construing what probable cause means in various
contexts . . . . [C]ourts will suffer from the lack of consistency and predictability of the new special
needs and reasonableness analyses.”); Shatz et al., supra note 130, at 8 (“The [T.L.O.] decision is
impossible to square with the Court’s prior Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”).
155
See Josh Kagan, Reappraising T.L.O.’s “Special Needs” Doctrine in an Era of School-Law
Enforcement Entanglement, 33 J.L. & Educ. 291, 316–20 (2004) (observing the exceedingly
difficult nature of distinguishing the level of suspicion required in a search, especially in light of the
increasing coordination between school officials and law enforcement in schools).

See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding (Redding), 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2638 (2009)
(Assistant Vice Principal); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328 (Assistant Vice Principal); Phaneuf v. Fraikin,
448 F.3d 591, 593 (2d Cir. 2006) (Principal); Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991
F.2d 1316, 1319 (7th Cir. 1993) (Dean, equivalent to a principal); Ex rel. Williams v. Ellington, 936
F.2d 881, 882–83, 882 (6th Cir. 1991) (Principal); Widener v. Frye, 809 F. Supp. 35, 36 (S.D. Ohio
1992) (Dean of Students and a former detective with the Cincinnati Police Department); Cales v.
Howell Pub. Schs., 635 F. Supp. 454, 455 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (Assistant Vice Principal); Coronado
v. State, 835 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (Assistant Principal); State ex rel. Galford v.
Mark Anthony B., 433 S.E.2d 41, 43 (W. Va. 1993) (Principal).
156

See Reamey, supra note 141, at 942; see also Kagan, supra note 155, at 307–08 (identifying
many state regulations and school board policies require school officials often to act in a law
enforcement type capacity and routinely work with law enforcement officials in search and seizure
situations); Michael Pinard, From the Classroom to the Courtroom: Reassessing Fourth Amendment
Standards in Public School Searches Involving Law Enforcement Authorities, 45 Ariz. L. Rev.
1067, 1069 (2003) (stating in many cases, courts have a tendency to interchange the roles of law
enforcement officers and school officials in school searches).
157

158
See Pinard, supra note 157, at 1082–83 (“[T]ensions inherent in these relevant factors, as
well as the inconsistent manner in which courts weigh these factors, the case law does not establish
clear parameters to guide school officials and law enforcement authorities.”); see also Mansukhani,
supra note 144, at 366 (citing In re P.E.A., 754 P.2d 382, 384 (Colo. 1988)) (stating there exists a
threat police officers could, and have, attempted to use school officials to carry out searches that
would ordinarily fail to meet a probable cause standard).
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probable cause in all but the least intrusive Terry-type searches would provide a
clear standard across the board, regardless of whether the search involves a school
administrator, law enforcement officer, or both.159

The Exclusionary Rule Safeguards Students’ Rights
Requiring a probable cause standard in school searches would also result in
a much needed benefit of instituting the exclusionary rule in school searches.160
The majority in T.L.O. ignored the original issue it granted certiorari for: to
determine if the exclusionary rule had a place in school searches.161 As evidenced
by Redding, students with legitimate Fourth Amendment claims experience an
almost impassable roadblock in upholding their rights against intrusions.162
Currently, the qualified immunity doctrine, the reduced protections inherent in
the T.L.O. reasonable suspicion standard, and the lack of a warrant requirement
“dramatically reduce the likelihood of success for the plaintiff student.”163 The
probable cause standard with the exclusionary rule attached would provide a
significant degree of deterrence to unreasonable conduct by school officials.164
Thus, even if courts continue to uphold qualified immunity in cases like Redding,
students will at least possess recourse through the exclusionary rule to prevent
evidence gathered in an unconstitutional search from being admissible against
them in criminal or juvenile proceedings.165

See Kagan, supra note 155, at 325 (claiming in light of the close cooperation between
school officials and law enforcement, T.L.O. represents a failing standard allowing students to find
themselves subjected to routine law enforcement procedures with none of the same protections
from police abuses adults possess); see also supra notes 155–58 and accompanying text.
159

160
See 1 LaFave, supra note 22, § 1.1 (explaining the exclusionary rule has been primarily
utilized to deter unconstitutional search and seizures by the government and that evidence found in
an unconstitutional search by the government is inadmissible in criminal proceedings).
161

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 327 (1985).

Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding (Redding), 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2644 (2009).
Redding’s only remaining recourse is to pursue the Monell claim. Id.; see also Pamela S. Karlan, The
Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1913, 1920 (2007) (asserting
in order to establish a Monell claim plaintiffs have to prove the government entity deprived them
of their constitutional rights, and that deprivation occurred pursuant to the government entity’s
official policy, which can be extremely difficult for students to satisfy).
162

163
Reamey, supra note 141, at 943–44; see also supra note 76 and accompanying text
(explaining that Redding only can pursue the Monell claim against the school district following the
Redding Court’s holding, which granted Wilson, Romero, and Schwallier qualified immunity).
164
Reamey, supra note 141, at 944 (“The exclusionary rule assumes greater significance in
deterring misconduct by school officials when considered in light of the rather restricted availability
of the civil remedy.”).
165
Id. at 944. This note does not advocate for the adoption of the exclusionary rule in school
disciplinary hearings, only criminal proceedings. See Thompson v. Carthage Sch. Dist., 87 F.3d
979, 981–82 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding the implementation of the exclusionary rule infeasible in
school disciplinary proceedings).
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The Merits of Probable Cause in Schools
Beyond the importance of implementing a clearer standard for officials,
courts, and practitioners is the need for schools to properly educate students
in the powers of the government and of their constitutional rights.166 The
school setting represents the first opportunity for children to experience their
constitutional rights in conjunction with the power of the government.167
By retaining the T.L.O. lesser suspicion standard in schools, the Court set a
dangerous precedent in the education of children—the full protection of their
privacy interest ends the moment they step onto school grounds.168 As Justice
Brennan critically stated in his dissenting opinion in Doe v. Renfrow: “Schools
cannot expect their students to learn the lessons of good citizenship when the
school authorities themselves disregard the fundamental principles underpinning
our constitutional freedoms.”169 Implementing a probable cause standard in
schools would emphasize to America’s youth from the beginning the importance
of their Fourth Amendment protections and legitimate expectations of privacy.170

Conclusion
The majority in T.L.O. created a standard it thought would adequately
provide a balance between students’ legitimate expectations of privacy and the
compelling interest of educators to maintain order and discipline in the school

See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (“The vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.”).
166

See Aizenstein, supra note 145, at 930 (observing the statements made by the Supreme
Court indicate the importance of schools in educating students about democratic principles);
see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 385–86 (1985) (Stevens, Marshall, & Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting & concurring). Stevens stated:
167

Through [the school] passes every citizen and public official, from schoolteachers to
policemen and prison guards. The values they learn there, they take with them in life.
One of our most cherished ideals is the one contained in the Fourth Amendment:
that the government may not intrude on the personal privacy of its citizens without
a warrant or compelling circumstance. The Court’s decision today is a curious moral
for the Nation’s youth.
Id.
See Gardner, supra note 114, at 907 (stating that outside of schools, courts grant youths the
full protection of the Fourth Amendment in searches and seizures by police); see also Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“It can hardly be argued that students . . . shed
their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gates.”); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (“[Schools] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous
protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its
source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”).
168

169

Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1027–28 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

See Aizenstein, supra note 145, at 930 (stating that implementing a probable cause standard
in school searches would demonstrate to students the importance of the Fourth Amendment
protections of privacy interests for everyone in a democratic society).
170
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setting.171 However, as evidenced by the last twenty-five years of school search
jurisprudence, especially in light of Redding, the reasonable suspicion standard is
too inconsistent to adequately protect students’ Fourth Amendment rights, and
too confusing to provide school administrators with a “flexible,” “common sense”
standard for searches.172 The solution is to rely on the only standard with a solid
foundation in the Constitution and a long history of jurisprudence: probable
cause.173 A Gates probable cause standard would provide school officials with a
clear, easy to understand framework for handling any search beyond a minimally
intrusive Terry “stop and frisk” search, while providing a clear protection for
students’ legitimate expectations of privacy.174 Finally, no other forum is more
appropriate to teach our students the core concepts of democracy, and the inherent
rights which follow, than our schools.175

171

See supra notes 36–42 and accompanying text.

172

See supra notes 109–44 and accompanying text.

173

See supra notes 147, 154 and accompanying text.

174

See supra notes 145–65 and accompanying text.

175

See supra notes 166–70 and accompanying text.
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